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“... une certaine nouvelle Logique” 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz on the 
need for simultaneously 
heterarchical and overarching 
relations between the confessions. 
 
 
I.  Blurring Boundaries 
 
Does the new economy dismantle the dichotomy of contract and association? Are 
strange hybrids and networks forcing us to abandon this fundamental distinction of 
private governance regimes? Thirty years ago, Philip Selznick had stressed the 
institutional differences between contract and association in order to show how much 
the modern realities of economic organizations had moved away from traditional 
contract. Thus, he suggested, organizations of the private sector were in need of and 
simultaneously responsive to the transfer of governance principles of public law and 
the political constitution.
1 Today, with the massive emergence of virtual enterprises, 
strategic networks, organizational hybrids, outsourcing and other forms of vertical 
disaggregation, franchising and just-in-time arrangements, intranets and extranets, 
the distinction of hierarchies and markets is apparently breaking down. The 
boundaries of formal organizations are blurring. This holds true for the boundaries of  
administration (hierarchies), of finance (assets and self-financing), of integration 
(organizational goals and shared norms and values) and of social relations (members 
and outside partners).
2 In formal organizations, membership becomes ambiguous, 
geographical boundaries do not matter much any more, hierarchies are flattened, 
functional differentiation and product lines are dissolved.
3 
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Not only sociological  and economic analyses deal with the break-down of the 
borderline between hierarchies and markets, but also legal practice has great 
problems in maintaining the clear-cut distinction between the basic private law 
categories of contract and association.
4 Anti-trust law has been the first victim of the 
network revolution. Many forms of vertical and horizontal market cooperation that had 
been prohibited as anti-competitive practices, are now legalized in the name of 
organizational efficiency.
5 Contract law suffers likewise: It is ad odds with the newly 
emerging “controrgs”, i.e. hierarchies constituted by market contracts.
6 And 
corporation law has to deal with chameleon-like shifting identities of corporate actors. 
In Selznick’s terms, the constitutional question of private governance needs to be 
raised again because a “conceptual readiness of the legal system” is lacking which 
could cope with the “opportunity structures” of the new networks.   
 
An “institutional analysis” in the spirit of Law, Society and Industrial Justice which 
would seek to re-establish this relation is confronted with two contradictory 
interpretations of the borderless organization.
7 Return to contract – that is how some 
economists interpret the development. The implicit message for a public law 
constitution of private enterprises is straightforward: De-constitutionalize the formal 
organization! They see (rigid) hierarchical organizations dissolving into (flexible) 
contracts. Networks are institutional arrangements half-way moving from hierarchies 
to markets. Economic theories of the firm react in a more indirect way by denying 
fundamental differences between contract and organization and reformulate the firm as 
a nexus of contracts. Organizations should be seen as contractual arrangements 
through which payment flows pass smoothly.
8 According to the extreme neoclassical 
version, organizations do not differ "in the slightest degree from ordinary market 
contracting between two people".
9 According to the more moderate institutionalist 
version, they differ only in the governance structures which are intended essentially to 
control opportunistic behavior.
10  Still, networks are seen as just "intermediates" 
between contract and organization.
11 Hybrid arrangements are chosen at a point on this 
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scale where on the one hand, market controls are weak because of the asset specificity 
of the  transaction, and on the other the transaction  costs of fully integrated 
organization are too high.
12 
 
The competing sociological interpretation makes an increasing “social 
embeddedness” of economic institutions responsible for the blurring of boundaries.
13 
The implicit policy message is: Strengthen communal norms in economic 
transactions! In networks, economic transactions are strongly influenced by ongoing 
social relations, by concrete histories of personal interaction. Networks are “more 
dependent on relationships, mutual interests and reputation – as well as less guided 
by a formal structure of authority”.
14 They are characterized by fairness as opposed 
to opportunism, diffuse moral obligations as opposed to formal contractual rules, 
generalized reciprocity as opposed to short-term equivalence.  
 
In my view, none of the two interpretations can claim supremacy, nor is an easy 
synthesis between them possible. Before sending normative messages, the point is 
to disentangle closely intertwined institutional developments and to introduce a clear 
distinction between two configurations that are often equivocated - networks and 
hybrids. These are different social institutions with distinct characteristics, but each 
tends to develop its own potential only via a close symbiosis.
15 My argument which 
distinguishes hybrids and networks and recombines them has five steps:  
 
1.  Network is a third type of private coordination, alongside contract and association. 
2.  Hybrids are not simply mixtures of network, contract and organization, rather 
social arrangements in their own right. They are based on the institutionalized re-
entry of a distinction into the positive side of the distinction. 
3.  Once the institutional differences between networks and hybrids are established, 
a parasitic relation between the two becomes viable.  
4.  Hybrid networks emerge as deparadoxifyers in a double bind situation. 
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5.  Private law needs to develop constitutional rules for a third private regime, beyond 
contract and association. Hybrid networks are new legal actants which are legally 
constituted  
a.  by intensified duties of cooperation within the network,  
b.  by multiple attribution and distributed responsibility between network and 
nodes, and  
c.  by constitutional guarantees of the nodes’ reflexive autonomy. 
  
II.  Legalizing Networks 
 
1.  Dangerous Supplements 
 
Patronage relations, clientelism, amici degli amici degli amici, quasi-feudal loyalty 
relations, old-boy networks, mafia-like structures are greatly at odds with the two 
modern rational institutions, contract and organization. Networks are in themselves 
effective forms of private coordination, but they are built neither on contractual 
consent nor on organizational membership. They create likewise strong and binding 
expectations. It would be misleading to subsume them under the category of 
relational contracting
16 since they are not based on the self-referential dynamic of 
constitutive legal acts: neither on concluding an agreement of reciprocal exchange 
nor on a foundational act of associational membership or pooling of resources, not to 
speak of something “in between”. Their rule producing devices are hetero-referential: 
networks rely on conditional trust relations.  The concept of network is defined neither 
by formal membership nor by reciprocal exchange but by a specific presumption of 
trust which is based on recognizable interests, on repeated interaction and on 
observation by third parties.
17 The sources of those network expectations are 
manifold and exterior to them: personal relations, family, kinship, friendship, 
neighborhood, profession, power, influence and various other forms of social 
interdependence.  
 
Recognizing networks – this has been a perennial problem for the law in the double 
sense of recognition. Behind the dominating presence of modern contract and 
organization, they were difficult to identify as institutions in their own right; and if so 
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they appeared as pre-modern ones, alienating, subverting or even corrupting modern 
purposive rationality. 
 
Thus, the reaction of contemporary law to personal networks has oscillated between 
outright hostility, cool indifference and cautious recognition.  Insofar as networks of 
personal relations are seen as directly compromising the integrity of modern 
institutions, legal rules have constantly tried to suppress these dangerous 
supplements of modernity as illegal forms of corruption, bribery, sabotage of 
hierarchical authority, transgression of institutional boundaries, collusion, 
cartellization and other anti-competitive practices. Other network phenomena, 
especially the famous informal group relations within hierarchical organizations, have 
not been penalized by the law but instead covered with the benign veil of legal 
ignorance. Only very few networks actually received a cautious and conditional legal 
recognition. But they were not recognized as social institutions in their own right. 
They appeared in law only under disguise. Networks were dressed up either as 
contractual expectations, as associational obligations, or as tort duties. For some 
networks, private law has indeed supported their trust based expectations and 
effectively sanctioned the breach of trust relations, but it did so with rather inadequate 
conceptual means.
18 They are usually couched in terms of good faith in contract law, 
duties of relational contracting, rules of reliance liability, special tort obligations, or 
legal duties of organizational loyalty. However, these doctrinal constructs can barely 
hide their foreign origin. And to call them judge-made law only conceals their 
character as interaction based obligations. Altogether, it remains a cautious and 
precarious legal recognition. They move in a grey area, always under the suspicion of 
being corrupt practices. The distrust, especially in the Anglo-American legal and 
economic culture, against juridifying phenomena like good faith, relational contract, 
and organizational loyalty, the feeling that strange corporatist, institutionalist, 
collectivist or paternalistic elements are creeping into modern purpose rationality, is 
indicative of their character as alien to contractual and organizational origins. 
 
2.  Productive Supplements? 
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The situation changes drastically with the recent network revolution. Today, these 
apparently pre-modern, non-rational, quasi-corrupt practices are becoming the 
driving force in hypermodern arrangements.
19 Suddenly, the highly suspicious 
networks are no longer seen as dangerous supplements but as productive 
supplements of modern rational institutions, opening for them new channels into the 
environment. One main reason for their massive re-emergence seems to be the 
knowledge-based character of new modes of production which relies less on 
traditional resources. The intangible assets of firms,   
 
“knowledge (intellectual capital), reputation and trust (social capital) as 
well as personal networks (relational capital) are of a paradoxical 
character: On the one side they are highly volatile, on the other side 
they are deeply embedded in social systems (embedded knowledge)”
20 
 
Since non-marketable knowledge is embedded in interpersonal relations and cannot 
be transferred via separable transactions of sharp contracting, economic 
organizations are driven toward network-like arrangements in which ongoing relations 
of personal trust are the basis of day-to-day discussions, constant exchange of 
information, recursive reinterpretation of events and common development of 
knowledge. While this would suggest their integration into a membership based 
formal organization, the required knowledge which is widely dispersed on the market 
cannot be created and cultivated within a long-term organization. This necessitates 
more flexible decentered arrangements searching the market for the knowledge 
sources. And due to the new information technology the costs of extra-organizational 
information processing are decreasing so that hierarchical arrangements become 
less and less feasible.
21 
 
Large technical systems are the other main reason why social networks gain new 
prominence. They are likewise based on conditional trust relations, however, of quite 
a different character. Personal trust is not at all present in these large and 
anonymous networks but an impersonal reliance on the regular course of 
technological processes. Technology based networks produce permanently not only 
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their standard technical procedures but at the same time they create - via informal 
coordination or formal decisions - standardized social expectations that result in trust 
presumptions of a different quality. It is no longer intimate knowledge of situations 
and persons but technology induced action chains that render the traditional market 
competition and exchange inadequate and require cooperation. The traditional 
solution for technical networks in transport, energy, communication, had been the 
“natural” monopoly of an integrated organization. In the breakup of these monopolies 
it is not the competitive market that replaces them but trust based networks of 
cooperation. Altogether it is the complexity of technical products, the pressure on 
storage costs, the introduction of direct client relation into the production chain, the 
problems of information asymmetries that make for an astonishing return of trust 
based networks into modern institutions which a realistic economic anthropology 
once asserted to be driven by opportunism with guile.
22 
 
In legal doctrine the most ambitious reaction to these developments is to construct a 
“network contract” as a full-fledged multilateral agreement.
23 A client who is dealing 
with a technical network is supposed to conclude a contract not only with his 
immediate partner but with an indefinite multiplicity of network participants who a 
priori have given their (implicit) mandate to conclude for them this contract as their 
authorized representative. From this moment on, contractual performance obligations 
and duties of care between the client and all network participants are supposed to 
emerge. Legal liability then is not derivative respondeat superior, but originary action 
directe against any network participant. 
 
The whole thing is an obvious fiction and a monstrous one. Mutual multilateral 
representation and a large number of implicit mandates in relation to potential clients 
do not reflect at all the transactional reality of large technical systems. Moreover, the 
contractual bond is stretched too far, when it comes to networks. There is no 
synallagmatic relation, no do ut des, between the network parties, bilateral or 
multilateral. Networks do display reciprocity but of a different kind. The whole point of 
a network as opposed to a multilateral contract in the strict technical sense of do us 
des ut det is an overarching, generalized reciprocity which expects returns not from 
the immediate transaction, rather from substantively indeterminate, socially diffuse 
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and long-term relations.
24 This may sound like a good basis for the category of 
relational contract.  And Macneil himself seems to agree when he defines the new 
world economy of turbo-capitalism as a huge relational contract.
25 However, 
relational contracts need as a basis for their obligations a constitutive legal act of 
contract conclusion, at least an implicit one, between the partners. And just this is not 
existent in networks of amici degli amici  whose expectations are based on entry by 
contact to just one node which creates the connection to the whole network, personal 
knowledge, repeated interaction and generalized reciprocity. 
 
If contract law fails to grasp the peculiarity of networks, the law of association and tort 
law do not fare much better. Indeed, tort lawyers tend to qualify networks as special 
tort relations which, compared with the anonymous relations among strangers typical 
for tort law, display different and higher standards of due care.
26 But there is a  
categorical  error involved: tort law is concerned with integrity interest, the protection 
of positions and rights, and not with performance interest in the movement of goods, 
services, and information which are the daily bread of network transactions. 
 
Some lawyers qualify networks as corporate law relations, as loose cooperation 
among autonomous actors toward a common end which makes them legally  into 
associations, partnerships or even corporate groups.
27 But here is another 
categorical error involved: While in associative relations resources and interests are 
pooled toward the achievement of a common purpose, the pooling aspect is virtually 
absent in networks. Amici degli amici are notorious individualists, they do not pool 
anything; they cooperate on the basis of an absent common purpose; there is no 
collectivity involved. It is trust on the performance of autonomous individual positions 
with diverging interests upon which they take their risk of individual performance 
without protection by an overarching organization. 
 
Result of our considerations so far is that private law needs a concept different from 
contract, tort, association which reflects the inner rationality and normativity of 
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networks. The corporate lawyer Richard Buxbaum concludes the question of legal 
qualification: 
 
"The complexity of the network, as distinguished from the 
dual/horizontal nature of the contract and the unitary/vertical nature of 
the firm, itself is a mechanism for this interactive form of 
communication. It is the multiple channels, their criss-crossing, their 
multi-directionality, that generate their interactive rather than top-down, 
or left-to-right communication."
28 
 
And it is probably the time-honored categories of trust, confidence or reliance which 
will guide the further juridification of networks. Indeed, trust, reliance, confidence, and 
of course good faith have been respectable categories of law which are however 
used, as we said above, only as derivatives of larger legal institutions. In the case of 
networks they need to be developed as a legal institution in their own right. Without a 
necessary coincidence with contract, tort or association these relations come into a 
legally relevant existence according to specific conditions, create rights and duties, 
produce external liabilities of a special kind, and develop their own rules for 
termination. 
 
III.  Constitutionalizing Hybrids 
1. Hybrids and Networks 
 
There is however one complication involved which makes it so difficult to disentangle 
the logic of networks from contract and association. If one looks into concrete 
arrangements of virtual enterprises, just-in-time, franchising, outsourcing, money 
transfer, strategic alliances, and other networks, one will frequently if not always find 
a considerable number of formal contracts and formal organizations connected to the 
wider network configuration. Does this not justify at the end to qualify those 
arrangements as contractual or associational in kind or as something intermediate, 
even though the boundaries of the single contracts and organizations involved do not 
coincide with the (usually larger) boundaries of the network? 
   10
There are two reasons why this suggestion goes wrong.  In the simplest case of 
personal networks (old boy networks, informal neighbor relations etc.) networks are 
sheer trust based interactions among individual or collective actors without any 
contractual or corporate, arrangements involved. But in the course of an 
institutionalization à la Philipp Selznick
29 many informal networks develop into full-
fledged autopoietic social systems, once their operations become recursive, once 
they develop a history of their own, once they acquire a distinct social identity, and 
particularly once they act in different environments.
30 Then they tend to be 
institutionalized in law as a relational contract or as a formal association, partnership, 
corporation or corporate group which may give them more stability and duration than 
a merely trust base would. And the networks themselves may even evolve into full 
fledged collective actors with a social identity of their own. Franchising systems are a 
case in point. They are, if the contradictio in adjectu  is allowed, contractual corporate 
actors.
31 But one should clearly see this as a overlayering of two different logics of 
obligation which does not put into question neither their analytical nor their empirical 
distinctness. Informal trust expectations which are typical for networks are 
overlayered by a formal contractual agreement and/or associational membership. 
And in these situations it may be for practical reasons sufficient to qualify them legally  
as obligations of contractual good faith, relational contracting or associational loyalty. 
But still the law would have to realize that the intensity and the quality of those bona 
fide obligations are of heteroreferential origin and not the result of self-referential 
recursivity in formal legal institutions. 
 
The other reason for the obvious confusion lies in the typically parasitic character of 
the new networks. The case in point are interorganizational networks and groups of 
contracts in industrial production where networks create informal horizontal relations 
between these institutions on several hierarchical levels.
32 Here from the very 
beginning, networks do not exist on their own like many of the traditional 
interpersonal networks do, but come into existence only when they are able to find 
exploitable institutions. They function as parasites, living on institutions and growing 
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with them, but at the same time resisting any attempt of control through them.
33 
Compared with the institutions which nourish them, they have their own distinct rules 
of inclusion/exclusion, they gain their influence exclusively from the institutions and 
tend to be their permanent supplements – productive or dangerous ones.  
 
Thus, it is the frequent coincidence of networks with formal contracts and 
organizations and their parasitic relation to them that makes it necessary 
simultaneously to separate the logic of networks from the logic of contract and 
organization, and to take their intimate symbiosis into account. In the economically 
relevant cases, networks do not appear in pure form just in and for themselves. 
Typically, networks appear as hybrids, in a tight combination with contractual 
arrangements or with formal organizations. 
2.The Underlying Dynamics 
 
But  why  hybrids? Why  this  massive  emergence  of  parasitic  networks  that  exploit 
modern social institutions. The answer is  -  double bind. Hybrid networks – this is my 
second  thesis  -    are  the  result  of  contradictory  or  even  paradoxical  demands  on 
formal contracts and formal organizations.
34 Hybrid arrangements then serve as de-
paradoxifyers. They emerge in situations of paradoxical communication where actors 
are exposed to contradictory messages (A = non-A), even to paradoxical messages (A 
because non-A). There are two ways out of these contradictions, one is repressive, to 
prohibit the paradox and to admit only one of the contradictory messages. But there is 
also  a  second  way  out,  a  productive  use  of  the  paradox,  a  way  to  make  the 
contradiction as such fruitful by creating a more complex representation of the world. 
We are advised to follow the directions of "morphogenesis", a conceptual construct 
which has been proposed by Krippendorff  in the context of paradoxes: 
 
  ' Unless  one  is  able  to  escape  a  paradoxical  situation  which  is  what 
Whitehead  and  Russell  achieved  with  the  theory  of  logical  types, 
paradoxes paralyze an observer and may lead either to a collapse of the 
construction of his or her world, or to a growth in complexity in his or her 
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representation  of  this  world.    It  is  the  latter  case  which  could  be 
characterized as morphogenesis' .
35 
 
If  in  a  double  bind  situation  people  choose  contractual  arrangements  they  tend  to 
repress one of the two contradictory messages. If they choose integrated hierarchical 
organizations they do the same thing for the other message. Under certain conditions, 
however,  hybrid  arrangements  provide  for  an  institutional  environment  where 
paradoxical  communication  is  not  repressed,  not  only  tolerated,  but  invited, 
institutionally  facilitated  and,  sometimes,  turned  productive.  Hybrids  as  a  highly 
ambiguous combination of networks with contracts and organizations seem to me the 
result of a subtle interplay between different and mutually contradicting logics of action. 
They are an institutional response to paradoxical communication in their environment. 
And while some of these paradoxes are lurking in their direct economic environment we 
should be aware of the fact that the paradoxes stem increasingly from contradictions 
between economic action on the one side, technological, scientific, cultural, medical and 
political action on the other side. In a sense, the communicative paradoxes are society’s 
revenge  for  the  autonomization  of  economic  action.  There  are  three  typical 
constellations  in  which  hybrids  are  the  morphogenetical  products  of  paradoxical 
economic communication. These constellations reveal the underlying requirements for 
the networks’ constitutionalization. 
 
(1) Co-opetition 
  
There is a first - should I say the standard - constellation of hybrid networks in which 
they  appear  as  the  result  of  contradictory  demands  from  the  market.  Economic 
transactions,  especially  when  they  deal  with  knowledge  based  products,  are 
simultaneously  exposed  to  the  contradictory  demands  of  competition/exchange  and 
cooperation/hierarchy. The paradoxical message is "Cooperate!" while at the same time 
the order is: "Compete!" The traditional reaction is to make a forced decision of the 
either-or-type. Result is the well-known rigid separation between market and hierarchies 
supported by similarly rigid rules of anti-trust law, contract law and corporation law. 
Each institutional answer, market or hierarchy, contract or organization, represses the 
paradox. Each favors predominantly one of the contradictory orientations while pushing 
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the  other  into  the  darkness  of  informality  where  it  is  sometimes  discovered  by 
subversive sociologists interested in the dark side of formal institutions.  
 
Recent analyses of business firms have described the emergence of hybrid networks 
as a more sophisticated, a more productive response to the contradictory demands of 
competition  and  cooperation.
36  “Co-opetition”  is  the  new  somewhat  trendy  magic 
formula which is supposed to be an intermingling of cooperation and competition in 
arrangements that blend organizations, contracts and network elements.
37 By contrast, 
in  the  perspective  of  de-paradoxification,  I  would  stress  the  aspect  of  "re-entry"  as 
against a mere mix of cooperation and competition. A mere blending of competitive and 
cooperative aspects would not be a way out of the oscillations of the paradox. Re-entry 
in its technical sense, as defined by Spencer Brown, however, is not blending the two 
sides of a distinction.
38 The distinction is not blurred, but strictly maintained and firmly 
institutionalized. At the same time the same distinction is drawn a second time, but re-
immersed  and  in  its  turn  institutionalized  within  one  of  the  two  sides  of  the  first 
distinction.  Thus,  we  have  two  fundamental  types  of  hybrids,  not  just  one. 
Organizational networks remain firmly institutionalized as formal organizations, but they 
re-introduce internally market elements via network structures. Contractual networks in 
their  turn  retain  their  contractual  character  but  they  create  on  this  basis  internally 
cooperative and even hierarchical structures.
39 In this way hybrid networks are atypical 
institutions. They do not combine on an equal basis network elements with contractual 
and  organizational  ones.  Rather,  they  create  a  primary  relation  of  contractual  or 
organizational  character  and  reconstruct  within  it  a  secondary  relation.  Thus,  the 
internal logic of the primary relation as a frame dominates and forces the secondary 
one to adapt. 
 
How does the law react to such a confusing arrangement? Obviously, this intermingling 
of competition and cooperation is greatly at odds with the policies of anti-trust law which 
draws a bright line between competitive markets where cooperation is outlawed as anti-
competitive and collusive behavior on the one side, and corporate arrangements where 
cooperation  between  members  is  legitimate  on  the  other.
40  Indeed,  European 
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competition  law  had  great  difficulties  in  recognizing  franchising networks.  After  long 
legal and political battles, exceptional permissions were granted on the ground that 
trademarks  and  other  efficiencies  deserve  to  be  protected.  EU-competition  law 
retreated to disclosure  requirements and to the delegation of  rule making  power  to 
private associations. Indeed the rulemaking power of private associations is indicative 
for the precarious blend between competition and cooperation which in order to avoid a 
“race  to  the  bottom”  excludes  individual  adjustment  and  requires  general  rules. 
However, at the same time the formulation, supervision and implementation of the rules 
is  not  left  to  regulatory  bodies,  governmental agencies,  or  the  courts  but  to private 
governance regimes. 
 
It is still an unresolved legal question under which condition networks violate the rules of 
competition law. In this policy-conflict between restraints of competition and efficiency of 
governance arrangements, the law is beginning to use the distinction between efficient 
and non-efficient networks. Centralized networks with a unitary organization which is 
centrally managed do not display the typical efficiency advantages, but only networks 
with an intelligent mixture of central and decentral management. A workable criterion for 
an  “authentic”  network  is  profit  sharing  between  the  nodes  and  the  centre  of  the 
network so that residual risk and residual profits remain with the decentral nodes. A 
centralized price policy of the whole network means that the efficiency advantages do 
not exist any more. Then an exception of the anti-trust rules is no longer feasible.
41  
 
(2) Unitas multiplex 
 
Things get more complicated if one looks in a second constellation to hybrid networks 
through the lenses of attribution theory which asks the question to whom economic 
action is attributed, to individual or to collective actors. The paradox involved here is the 
famous "unitas multiplex", the confusing multiplicity of independent actors within the 
unity of a collective actor.
42 Is the network just a nexus of trust based relations between 
self-interested actors or a collective actor in its own right which emerges as a new 
player  and  to  which  participants  in  the  net  owe  loyalty?  The  contradiction  of  the 
simultaneous messages to act rationally looks quite different in this context. On the one 
side "Obey! You are part of a larger common enterprise", and on the other side "Be 
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autonomous! You are a self-responsible actor". Again, the rigid choice between contract 
and organization which was the traditional approach in both economic theory and legal 
doctrine leads only to repressive solutions of the paradox. Hybrid networks in their turn 
find a creative de-paradoxifying solution - "double attribution". This innovative attribution 
technique is one of the most important characteristics of hybrid networks distinguishing 
them from simple attribution to individual actors in contract and to collective actors in 
organizations.  One  and  the  same  economic  transaction  is  attributed  twice,  to  the 
individual actor as the node in the network and to the overarching network itself.
43  
   
What hybrid networks gain through double attribution is a drastic improvement of their 
relation to the environment. One and the same network can appear in one environment 
as a multitude of individual actors connected by single contracts, and in a different 
environment as one collective actor, as an autonomous player with a distinct identity in 
a different game. This chameleon-like quality of hybrid networks gives them access to 
new environments which would not be accessible to them if they were exclusively either 
a mere nexus or a mere collective unit.  
 
With  these  new  forms  of  action  attribution  new  risks  emerge  that  require  a  legal 
responsibility of networks which is different from both individual liability and collective 
liability  of  organizations.  Elsewhere  I  have  argued  at  length  for  a  special  network 
liability.
44 In continuation of this argument I would like to concentrate now on two points: 
distributed vs. centralized liability and interface liability in networks. While “piercing the 
contractual veil” is the general formula for a network liability, a distinction is needed for 
two  typical  situations,  i.e.  centralized  and  decentralized  networks.  Some  hybrid 
networks are so highly centralized and the autonomy of their nodes is reduced to such 
a degree that they are nothing but hierarchical organizations in contractual disguise. 
These networks are used as strategic instruments to evade mandatory rules of law. 
Empirical evidence supports the claim that firms use indeed disaggregation strategies in 
order to circumvent tort liability
45 and employment protection laws.
46 What economists 
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euphemistically call "flexibility" then turns out, in the sober language of the law, to be an 
evasion of mandatory rules.
47 
 
In cases where the economic reality of contractual networks is a tightly coordinated 
organization which is highly integrated in their information, production, distribution and 
hierarchical  command  structure,
48  legal  policy  cannot  tolerate  such  an  evasion  of 
mandatory duties by the mere choice of legal form. And it need not since due to their 
centralization these quasi-hybrids which are in reality integrated organizations do not 
display  any  more  the  efficiency  advantages  which  consists  in  the  autonomy  of  the 
network nodes. The law must treat these arrangement as what they are in economic 
reality:  as  fully-fledged  organizations  to  which  mandatory  rules  have  to  be  directly 
applied. Since highly centralized hybrids are integrated functional economic units they 
must also be liability units. This is the solution of the new labor law in Spain.
49 This is 
the reason why in the banking sector, several lawyers plead for the full responsibility of 
the  customer  bank  for  the  whole  transfer  process  in  the  money  transfer  chain.
50 
Similarly, when franchising nets are highly centralized they need to be treated explicitly 
as full-fledged corporate arrangements and exposed to the mandatory rules of the law 
of  economic  enterprises.  Other  lawyers  propose  treating  centralized  bundles  of 
franchise contracts according to corporate law. In Germany, they even go so far as to 
argue that highly centralized forms of franchising should be subject to the German law 
of  groups  on  companies.  Result  is  a  far-reaching  collective  liability  of  the  whole 
network.
51 Organizational liability rules would be especially suited to those cases in 
which franchising committees as quasi-corporate bodies make collective decisions for 
the whole network.
52 
 
The liability situation is different in decentralized networks. While external liability of the 
network itself, and not only of the individual units, should be provided by the law, such a 
piercing  of  the  contractual  veil  should  result  not  in  the  unified  collective  liability  of 
corporation law. Instead, a decentralized, multiple, and selectively combined liability of 
the network  and  the  concretely  involved nodes  is  the  adequate form of liability. As 
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against  fully  collectivized  liability  of  the  formal  organization  this  results  in  a  relative 
re-individualization of collective liability in networks. In analogy to the well-known market 
share liability one could speak of a “network share liability” which is especially important 
in situations where causation of damage cannot be traced back to individual nodes, but 
only to the network itself.
53 In this situation no traditional collective actor is involved 
whose assets could serve as a liability basis. But the network does serve as the focal 
point of attribution of liability and as the starting point for re-individualizing liability for the 
nodes. Especially in situations where the individual contribution of singular nodes is no 
longer  traceable,  such  a  re-individualization  is  urgently  needed.  A  joint and  several 
liability would be excessive, however, and should be replaced by a pro-rata-liability of 
the nodes involved, according to their share in the whole network. 
 
Interface-liability  is  the  second  conspicuous  aspect  of  an  enlarged  responsibility  of 
networks. The change from hierarchy to network creates new interfaces between nodes 
that once upon a time had been covered by intra-organizational coordination. On the 
other side, in a competitive market situation with firms offering partial elements it is the 
risk of the customer to control the interfaces of the separate products. Networks again 
are different. They offer the complex product while due their decentralized structure, the 
risk of interface problems is increased. Indeed, empirical research in product safety 
suggests that in highly decentralized constellations where decision-making power lies 
with satellite firms there emerge "especially subtle hazards caused by the interaction of 
subsystems in a technologically complex product". The high division of labor and the 
highly decentralized controls which we typically find in hybrids for the risks that arise for 
"...there is a temptation to believe that the product as a whole is safe if each subsystem 
is safe".
54 Thus, the very character of the hybrid network with all its efficiencies creates 
external risks due to a lack of coordination among the nodes.  
 
French law has developed a decentralized solution. In special situations in the health 
and social security sector, the law imposes a duty of coordination on each network 
node involved and sanctions a breach of these duties with responsabilité solidaire.
55 In 
a different situation of chantiers temporaires et mobiles, a directive of the European 
Union  orders  the  network  nodes  to  install  a  central  coordinator  with  contractually 
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defined  responsibilities  and  to  establish  a  collège  interentreprise  with  employee 
participation.
56  These  are  still  particularistic  but  quite  innovative  expressions  for  an 
emerging  interface  responsibility  for  networks.  According  to  the  concrete  network 
structure they are in need of either a more centralized or a more decentralized legal 
procedure of coordination with subsequent collective legal liabilities. 
 
(3) Private-public networks 
 
The conflict between different logics of action within economic arrangements becomes 
fully apparent when we look at a third constellation of hybrids. To illustrate this, let me 
briefly refer to a case study.
57 In order to induce technological change, a governmental 
agency granted massive subsidies for common research between a branch of industry 
and independent research institutions. Result was a loosely organized network of long-
term-contracts  bringing  together  a  technological  community  with  close  ties  to  the 
relevant industries, the scientific institutions involved and the interested governmental 
agencies.  The  study  found  out  that  the  network  came  up  indeed  with  successful 
innovations, but in terms of transaction costs it behaved as irrational and extravagant as 
a series of United Nations conferences. 
 
In this and in other cases of private-public cooperative arrangements which are very 
fashionable in the current wave of privatization we can again identify an underlying 
paradox. Again its origin is a conflict of different logics of action. But this time it seems 
to lie not only in the conflict between competition and cooperation, nor in the conflict 
between collective and individual action. Rather it is the conflict of different rationalities 
in society which drives the private-public arrangements into confusion. This time the 
request on the actors is to behave according to several contradictory logics of action. 
The double bind turns into a multiple bind. In our case of a public-private research 
network, rational actors are to obey simultaneously three mutually exclusive categorical 
imperatives. Imperative One: "Act so that the maxims of your will can always at the 
same time serve as a model for general political legislation!" Imperative Two: "Act so 
that the maxims of your will can always at the same time serve to minimize transaction 
costs!" Imperative Three: "Act so that the maxims of your will can always at the same 
                                                            
56 Dir. Nr. 92/57 24 June 1992. 
57 Lütz 1993  p. 192ff.   19
time serve to expand in a disinterested way knowledge on the basis of scientific truth!". 
Immanuel Kant would turn around in his grave.  
 
If in this situation, one had chosen bilateral contractual exchanges between scientific 
institutes,  profit-driven  firms,  and  governmental  agencies,  one  would  have  indeed 
successfully suppressed the paradox. Each collective actor would have obeyed one 
and only one of the three logics of action involved and then entered into an exchange 
relation. But the price would have been that no close encounter between the different 
ways to construct knowledge could have happened. Vice versa, if one had chosen an 
organizational integration of the whole enterprise, one would have found a way to unite 
successfully the three requirements, as is known from the model of R&D departments in 
economic organizations. But the prize would have been that one action logic would 
have  dominated  the  other  two  with  the  consequence  that  scientific  and  political 
processes and results would have been economically instrumentalized. In contrast to 
both  solutions,  the  loosely  coupled  network  that  emerged  in  this  case  apparently 
allowed for a strange squaring of the circle. Indeed, in their hybrid character, networks 
seem to be tailored to the bridging of different contradictory rationalities. They allow for 
their mutual interference without a hierarchical ranking among them.  
 
In  the  case  of  mixed  network  regimes,  the  law  of  private  governance  cannot  rely 
exclusively  on  an  economic  interpretation  of  its  internal  dynamics.  It  is  clearly  not 
sufficient to develop legal rules which concentrate on supporting the transaction costs 
advantages  or  the  efficiency  gains  of  networks  as  opposed  to  contractual  or 
organizational  arrangements.  Indeed,  these  networks  do  violate  the  imperatives  of 
transaction cost minimization and allocative efficiency and are successful nevertheless 
in innovation. In the spirit of Law, Society and Industrial Justice, a broader public law 
concept of a network constitution is required which would indeed transfer principles of 
institutional  autonomy,  constitutional  rights,  due  process,  rule  of  law,  public 
accountability to these mixed private-public configurations.
58 
 
But there is one element in the mixed networks that drives them beyond the dichotomy 
of private and public. We found it in the multiple bind of intersystemic networks. The 
private-public  distinction  is  not  rich  enough  to  understand multiple bind.  In  order  to 
                                                            
58 Selznick 1969.   20
regulate  the  hybrid  networks  adequately,  the  law  would  have  to  develop  an 
understanding of the network logic that relies on multiple constructs which would come 
from different origins: economics, political theory, legal theory, sociology of science, 
technology  and  other  social  sectors  involved.  Each  of  them  can  be  understood  as 
reflecting a sectorial rationality which the network must bring together without blending 
them.  Law’s  attention  would  have  to  focus  on  the  bewildering  situation  that  such 
networks are driven by contradictory imperatives which come from a plurality of social 
systems, and that there is no comprehensive meta-discourse that has the capacity to 
unite them. And from the beginning it is excluded that law take over the role of a meta-
discourse. 
 
And here is the most important task for a legal constitutionalization of hybrid networks. 
As  opposed  to  instrumental  autonomy,  I  call  it  the  legal  guarantee  of  “reflexive 
autonomy” to the individual nodes of the network. In integrated organizations, whether 
private  enterprises  or  public  organizations  or  mixed  regimes,  the  legal  rules  of 
organizational procedures are geared toward a common purpose orientation. And when 
it  comes  to  decentralization  and  delegation  of  functions,  the  character  of  these  is 
necessarily instrumental. Decentralized units have the freedom to choose in the light of 
their  superior  local  knowledge  the  concrete  means  that  are  adequate  to  reach  the 
collective purpose of the comprehensive organization. But even in highly decentralized 
organizations the precarious balance between what the organization perceives as its 
general function and its concrete contribution to the environment is a matter of collective 
reflexion,  to  be  sure,  not  necessarily  at  the  top,  but  necessarily  as  a  common 
enterprise. And public law as well as corporation law in their constitutional, procedural 
and  substantive  elements  are  geared  toward  this  collective  reflexion  of  the 
organization’s role. 
 
This is different in inter-systemic networks. Legal rules need to support the autonomy of 
the nodes of the network not only to a higher degree but also of a different quality so 
that they maintain - against all tendencies of centralization - the capacity of reflexion, i.e. 
the capacity to balance on their own the relation between what they perceive as their 
social function and their contribution to the environment.
59 In our example this amounts 
to  a  quasi-constitutional  guarantee  of  freedom  of  research  as  against  political  and   21
economic interferences within the confines of a mixed network. And indeed, this idea 
needs  to  be  generalized.  Unlike  the  situation  of  a  corporate  group  where  legal 
guarantees of the autonomy of the subsidiaries protect the profit interests of the parts 
against those of the whole and vice versa, in the situation of inter-systemic networks it 
is the institutional integrity of research, health, education, journalism, technology, art 
which needs to be respected in the (not only decentralized but) decentred structure of 
autonomous nodes and overarching network. While in the law of corporate groups it 
makes still sense to formulate a comprehensive “group interest” in terms of procedural 
and  substantive  legal  rules,  a  “network  interest”  exists  only  as  compatibility  of 
autonomous network participants.  
 
Is there an implicit message for legal policies as opposed to “De-constitutionalize formal 
organizations!”  or  “Strenghten  communal  norms!”?  If  any,  it  is:  “Strengthen  the 
networks’ polycontexturality!” This  is a neologism for an  old  idea. Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz had developed the idea in the connection between theodicy and the reform of 
the church.
60 Collisions between incompatible norms require new institutional forms. He 
requested  “...  une  certaine  nouvelle  Logique”  according  to  which  unity  becomes 
thinkable as multiplicity in such a way that individual manifestations of one principle are 
coordinated without at the same time being dissolved into a higher generality. Leibniz 
searched  for  harmony  not  by  homogenization  but  by  constructive  interweaving  of 
diversities and contradictions. This is network logic. If God’s word is expressed as a 
double bind to the believers, if they are exposed simultaneously to bona opera and to 
solo  gratia,  if  the  contradictory  command  is  “Obey  the  hierarchy!”  and  “Obey  your 
conscience!”, then the alternative between interconfessional war or submission to the 
repressive  church  hierarchy  seems  inevitable.  Polycontexturality  which  combines 
heterarchy  with  an  overarching  unity  would  represent  the  new  institutional  logic  in 
ecclesia semper reformanda. 
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